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Abstract
This study is concerned with the impact of changes in market transparency on
agricultural production levels. Market transparency is of central importance in the
agri-food system as it affects the degree of uncertainty farmers face when taking
economic decisions. In our study, we endogenize uncertainty by establishing a link
between market transparency and the terms of contracting on the futures market. We
find that a higher degree of market transparency leads to higher expected profits but
does not increase agricultural production levels per se. However, when farmers have
no access to futures markets, transparency does increase ex ante expected uility and
output.
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Background
Markets for important food staples as grains and vegetable oils have seen a great deal
of turmoil over the past decade. Particularly, uncertainty associated with price volatility
negatively affects investment and production decisions by risk-averse farmers. An intu-
itive illustration is given by Figure 1 that displays the FAO real monthly food as well as the
respective cereals price index. The data shows that global food markets exhibited serious
patterns of uncertainty over the past decade.
However, the role of technology adoption and adjustment of supply is of central
importance with respect to securing adequate levels of agricultural production and
achieving global food security. Consequently, recent studies stressed the role of market
transparency and information flows for improving production decisions in agricul-
tural markets (see UNCTAD 2011). Thus, market transparency can be understood
in terms of parameters that, at least partially, are under control of public and pri-
vate agencies. Governmental and non-governmental organizations then may enhance
transparency by providing a greater deal and more reliable information on impor-
tant determinants of price movements, such as indicators of climate change, interna-
tional market conditions, government price stabilization schemes, weather forecasts,
disaster relief programs, stricter food safety standards, insurance and alternatives
(UNCTAD 2011).
Against this background, the present study is concerned with the impact of changes in
markets transparency on agricultural production levels. In particular, we study how the
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Figure 1 FAO real food price indices. The FAO real food price index consists of the average of 5 commodity
group (meat, dairy, cereals, oil, sugar) price indices weighted with the average export shares of each of the
groups for 2002-2004. The cereals price index is compiled using the grains and rice price indices weighted by
their average trade share 2002-2004. The Grains Price Index consists of International Grains Council (IGC)
wheat price index and 1 maize export quotation. The Rice Price Index consists of 3 components containing
average prices of 16 rice quotations: the components are Indica, Japonica and Aromatic rice varieties and the
weights for combining the three components are assumed (fixed) trade shares of the three varieties.
ex ante expected volume of agricultural production responds to additional information
when information also affects the futures market for agricultural commodities. Earlier
studies addressing this issue have modeledmarket transparency solely by means of exoge-
nous changes in the distributional parameters of the market price. In such a framework,
the futures market is completely separated from the underlying transparency concept
(see Newbery and Stiglitz 1981, Kawai and Zilcha 1986, Frechette 2000, Moschini and
Hennessy 2001, Allen and Lueck 2003 as well as Hudson 2007).
In our view, this approach misses out an important link that exists between market
transparency and risk-sharing opportunities on futures markets. In our model, we endo-
genize uncertainty through an information system provided by governmental and non-
governmental organizations or related agencies that explicitly links market transparency
to the terms of contracting on the futures market.
The notion of market transparency underlying this approach is adopted from the work
of Eckwert and Zilcha (2001, 2003). Along the seminal contributions of Blackwell (1953)
and Hirshleifer (1971), market transparency is linked to the informativeness of an observ-
able signal which is (imperfectly) correlated with the future spot price. The uncertainty
the farmer is exposed to then depends on the observed signal as well as on the information
system within which the signal can be interpreted. We find that a higher degree of market
transparency leads to higher expected profits but does not increase agricultural produc-
tion levels per se. However, when we vary the prevailing risk-sharing regime such that
farmers have no access to futures markets, transparency does increase ex ante expected
utility and output.
In particular, we consider a model where a farmer faces risky revenues due to a ran-
dom product price. The distribution of the price is given and there exists a futures
market (see, for example, Broll et al. 2013). The terms at which the farmer can hedge
the revenue risk through trade in futures contracts negatively depends on the degree of
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market transparency. Higher market transparency then affects the farmer’s production
decision in two opposing ways. Firstly, price uncertainty declines and ex ante expected
utility increases, resulting in higher production levels. Secondly, additional information
on future market conditions may interfere with the operation of risk-sharing markets and
thereby decrease ex ante expected utility and production levels.
The paper is organized as follows. In section ‘Methods’, we introduce the model and
our concepts of information and market transparency. Our main results are derived in
section ‘Results and discussion’. Section ‘Conclusions’ concludes.
Methods
The farmer produces in period 0 and sells her products in period 1 for a random price.
Production costs, c(q), are a strictly increasing and convex function of the volume of pro-
duction q. The firm’s random revenues, as of date 1, are p̃q, where p̃ is the one period
ahead spot market price. The tilde refers to the random nature of the spot price which
assumes values in  :=[ p, p], where 0 < p < p < ∞.
Prior to choosing a production level, the farmer observes a signal s from a governmental
or non-governmental organization and/or a related agency. This signal is the realization
of a random variable s̃ which is correlated with p̃. The signal contains public information
about the unknown future market price p. Thus, at the time when input and produc-
tion decision are made, the relevant price expectation is the updated in a Bayesian way.
Figure 2 depicts how the sequence of events unfolds in the model.
Futures markets for agricultural commodities open at date 0 after the signal has been
observed. Let h be the future commitment of the farmer, i.e., h denotes the number of
futures contracts sold by the farmer. To focus on the farmer’s hedging motive as opposed
to a speculative motive, we assume that the commodity derivative is unbiased. Therefore,
the forward rate f0(s) is equal to the conditional mean of a contract’s payoff,
f0(s) = E[ p̃|s] . (1)
Both, the payoff and the purchase price of the contract fall due in period 1.
The farmer’s decision problem
The risk-averse farmer is maximizing expected utility, defined over random profits, ̃, i.e.
̃ = p̃q − c(q) − ( p̃ − f0(s))h. (2)
The decision making problem can be written as
max
q, h
E[U(̃)|s] , (3)
10
The public signal is observed.
The farmer makes her production
and hedging decisions.
The market price is realized.
The farmer sells her output and
settles her futures position.
Figure 2 Sequence of events.
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where U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable
utility function. The necessary first-order conditions, which are also sufficient, are
E[U ′(̃)( p̃ − c′(q))|s] = 0, (4)
E[U ′(̃)( f0(s) − p̃)|s] = 0, (5)
where U ′ and c′ are denoting marginal utility and marginal cost of production. From (4),
(5) and the unbiasedness assumption, we obtain the optimal levels of production and
hedging:
c′(q(s)) = f0(s) and h = q(s). (6)
For our model, equation (6) establishes the validity of the separation theorem and the
full-hedging hypothesis. Thus, in the presence of risk-sharing markets, entrepreneurial
decisions are independent of attitudes towards risk and, moreover, all risks will be
fully hedged if the futures market is unbiased (see, for example, Wong 2007). Next we
define our notion of market transparency. Following Eckwert and Zilcha (2001, 2003),
transparency will be linked to the informational content of the signal s under different
information systems and risk-sharing regimes.
Information systems andmarket transparency
We identify the transparency of a market with the informativeness of the signal s ∈ S,
which is provided by a governmental or non-governmental organization or a related
agency. The informativeness of a given signal then depends on the information system
within which the signal can be interpreted. An information system, denoted by g, specifies
for each state of nature, p, a conditional probability function over the set of signals: g(s|p).
The positive real number g(s|p) defines the conditional probability (density) that the sig-
nal s will be observed if the true (yet unknown) state of nature is p1. Using Bayes’ rule, the
farmer revises her expectations and maximizes utility on the basis of the updated beliefs.
The density for the prior distribution over S is given by
ν(s) =
∫
S
g(s|p)π( p) dp for all s, (7)
where π denotes the Lebesgue density function for the prior distribution over S. The
density function for the updated posterior distribution over S is
ν( p|s) = g(s|p)π( p)/ν(s). (8)
Blackwell (1953) suggested a criterion that ranks different information systems accord-
ing to their informational content. Suppose g1 and g2 are two information systems with
associated density functions ν1(·) and ν2(·). The following criterion induces an ordering
on the set of information systems.
Information systems. The information system g1 is said to be more informative than g2
if there exists an integrable function λ such that∫
S
λ(s′, s) ds′ = 1, (9)
holds for all s, and
g2(s′|p) =
∫
S
g1(s|p)λ(s′, s) ds (10)
holds for all p ∈ S.
2013, 1:15
http://www.agrifoodecon.com/content/1/1/15
Ahlers et al. Agricultural and Food Economics Page 5 of 10
According to this criterion g1 inf g2, holds if g2 can be obtained from g1 through a pro-
cess of randomization. The probability density λ(s′, s) in equation (10) transforms a signal
s into a new signal s′. If the s′-values are generated in this way, the information system g2
can be interpreted as being obtained from the information system g1 by adding random
noise. Therefore, the signals under information system g2 convey no information about
the value of p̃ that is not already conveyed by the signals under information system g1. As a
consequence, the a priori expected posterior price uncertainty under g1 will be lower than
under g2.
As noted before, our notion of market transparency is based on the informational con-
tent of the signal s. We characterize a market as more transparent if the signal conveys
more precise information about the future market price.
Market transparency. Agri-food markets are said to be more transparent under g1 than
under g2 if g1 inf g2.
The following lemma contains a property of information systems that turns out to
be a very convenient tool for economic analysis. The lemma formulates a transparency
criterion that is equivalent to the condition stated above.
Lemma 1. The agri-food market is more transparent under g1 than under g2 if and
only if∫
S
F(ν1(·|s))ν1(s) ds ≥
∫
S
F(ν2(·|s))ν2(s) ds
holds for every convex function F(·) on the set of density functions over .
A proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Kihlstrom (1984). Note that ν1(·|s) and ν2(·|s)
are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems. Thus, Lemma 1 implies that
higher transparency (weakly) raises the expectation of any convex function of posterior
beliefs. In other words, additional information is equivalent to introducing a mean pre-
serving spread in the probability of success. If the maximum expected utility is a convex
function of the probability of success, information raises the ex ante expected utility of
any risk-averse farmer.
Results and discussion
We now turn to the question how the ex ante expected volume of agricultural output is
affected when the market becomes more transparent, i.e. when additional public infor-
mation about future market conditions becomes available. We consider two cases. First,
we assume that the farmer has full access to futures markets to hedge her revenue risk. In
a second step, we consider a world where the farmer has no access to futures markets or
other risk-sharing opportunities.
Impact of market transparency in the presence of futures market
The production, q, is contingent on the signal s. We define the volume of production, Q,
as the average agricultural output before the signal has been observed,
Q = Es[ q(s)]=
∫
S
q(s)ν(s) ds (11)
Now we characterize the impact of higher market transparency on the volume of
production in terms of the curvature of the marginal cost function.
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Proposition 1. Higher transparency in the agricultural market leads to a higher (lower)
expected level of supply if, and only if, the marginal cost function, c′(q), is strictly concave
(convex).
Proof of Proposition 1. It is evident from equation (1) that f0 is a linear function of
the posterior probability density function, ν( p|s). Lemma 1 and equation (11) imply that
the average level of supply increases (decreases) with higher transparency in the agri-
cultural market if, and only if, q( f0) is strictly convex (concave) in f0. From equation (6)
we obtain
q′′( f0) = − c
′′′[ q( f0)]
c′′[ q( f0)]2
. (12)
The desired result follows from equation (12).
As just seen, the impact of higher transparency on agricultural production depends
only on the curvature of the marginal cost function. Concavity of the marginal cost func-
tion is a pattern sometimes seen in agriculture where the presence of fixed input factors
(e.g. land and building of fixed size) constrains production.
By contrast, production processes that exhibit high substitutability among input factors
may give rise to convex marginal cost functions. If the cost function is quadratic, i.e. the
marginal cost function is linear, production will not be affected by changes in market
transparency.
The result in Proposition 1 differs from the role attributed to market trans-
parency in earlier studies which have modeled changes in transparency simply by
means of an exogenous change in the distributional parameters of the market price.
Our approach implies that market transparency affects the terms of contracting on
the futures market and, hence, the farmer’s production decision and output. The
endogenous terms of futures contracting, therefore, constitutes an important link
through which market transparency may affect the volume of supply in agricultural
markets.
To illustrate our result and the impact of market transparency on the expected level
of agricultural supply, we now consider an example with binary information structure.
Under information system g1, the signal provides full information about the futuremarket
price. Under information system g2 the signal is completely uninformative.
Example
The farmer’s cost function takes the form c(q) = (1/a)qa, a > 1. The signal space
contains two signals, s1 and s2. The market price takes the values p1 and p2, p1 < p2
with prior probabilities equal to 1/2. The information system is given by the conditional
probabilities g(s1|p1) = g(s2|p2) = β , and g(s1|p2) = g(s2|p1) = 1 − β , β ∈[ 1/2, 1].
The parameter β measures the transparency of the agricultural market: for β = 1 the
information system is fully informative indicating a transparent market; for β = 1/2
the information system is fully uninformative indicating an intransparent agricultural
market.
The prior signal probabilities are
n(s1) = g(s1|p1)f ( p1) + g(s1|p2)f ( p2) = n(s2) = 1/2. (13)
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The posterior state probabilities can be calculated as
ν( p1|s1) = ν( p2|s2) = β and ν( p2|s1) = ν( p1|s2) = 1 − β . (14)
From (13) and (14) we get
f0(s1) = p1 + ( p2 − p1)(1 − β), (15)
f0(s2) = p1 + ( p2 − p1)β . (16)
The separation theorem (see equation (6)) implies q = ( f0)1/(a−1). Therefore, ex ante
expected output, Q, reads
Q = 1
2
{
[ p1 + ( p2 − p1)(1 − β)]1/(a−1) +[ p1 + ( p2 − p1)β]1/(a−1)
}
. (17)
Now we compare the expected output supply in a transparent market, Qt , with the
expected output volume in an intransparent agricultural market, Qit . Setting β = 1 and
β = 1/2 we get
Qt = 12[ p
1/(a−1)
1 + p1/(a−1)1 ] , (18)
Qit = ( p1 + p2)2
1/(a−1)
. (19)
Let us choose p1 = 5, p2 = 15 and a = 11/10. Then, the ratio Qt/Qit is much larger
than 1. If a takes values larger than 2, then ratio Qt/Qit is smaller than 1. In that case,
higher market transparency reduces the expected volume of agricultural supply. However,
the effect tends to be small.
Before we vary the prevailing risk-sharing regime, we now turn to the impact of changes
in market transparency on the farmer’s expected profits.
Proposition 2. Higher transparency in the agricultural market always leads to an
increase in the farmer’s expected profits. Ex ante expected profits
E(̃) =
∫
S
(s)ν(s) ds (20)
are higher under g1 than under g2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proceeding along the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 1
we need to show that
( f0) = f0q( f0) − c(q( f0)) (21)
is a convex function of f0(s). In the optimum, differentiating with respect to f0 yields
′( f0) = q( f0) > 0 and ′′( f0) = q′( f0) > 0. (22)
An increase in f0 has a first-order effect on the farmer’s maximum profit through the
revenues f0q( f0). Since the farmer sells more when f0 increases, this first-order effect
on ( f0) is stronger for larger values of f0 and weaker for lower values. As a result, the
farmer’s profit function is convex in the forward rate. A more transparent agricultural
market makes f0 more sensitive to changes in the public signal, thereby leading to higher
expected profits.
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According to Proposition 2, highermarket transparency leads to higher expected profits
regardless of attitudes towards risk and of technological parameters as long as the cost
function is convex. This result does not imply, however, that the farmer will be better off
in terms of ex ante expected utility. When the signal affects an insurable risk, like in our
model, the value of additional information depends on two opposing effects.
Firstly, when the farmer receives more reliable information she is able to improve her
decisions, thereby increasing ex ante expected utility (Blackwell effect). Secondly, as was
pointed out by Hirshleifer (1971), additonal information may interfere with the opera-
tion of risk-sharing markets thereby destroying some risk-sharing opportunities. Since
the farmer is risk-averse, ex ante expected utility declines. Due to these opposing effects,
the overall impact of higher market transparency on the farmer’s ex ante expected utility
is ambiguous.
Impact of market transparency in the absence of futures market
To further illustrate the interaction between the Blackwell and the Hirshleifer effect, we
now consider the case when the farmer has no access to futures markets or other risk-
sharing opportunities. The above results suggest that the (negative) Hirshleifer effect
vanishes and the ex ante expected utility depends on the (positive) Blackwell effect only.
Proposition 3. If agricultural commodities cannot be traded on a futures market at
date 0, ex ante expected utility is higher under information system g1 than under g2.
Proof of Proposition 3. In the absence of a futures market, the first-order condition for
a farmer’s decision problem reads
E[U ′(̃)( p̃ − c′(q))|s]= 0. (23)
Denote the unique solution to (23) by q(s) and define
U(q(s), p) = U[ pq(s) − c(q(s))] .
The value function is
V (ν(·)|s) =
∫
S
U(q(s), p)ν( p|s)dp. (24)
To proof our proposition, we have to show that the value function is convex in the
posterior belief ν(·|s). Assume ν(·|s) = βν1(·|s)+(1−β)ν2(·|s),β ∈[ 0, 1]. Denote by q1(s)
and q2(s) the optimal agricultural supply under the posterior beliefs ν1(·|s) and ν2(·|s),
respectively. We obtain
V (ν( p|s)) =
∫
S
U(q(s), p)[βν1( p|s) + (1 − β)ν2( p|s)] dp
= β
∫
S
U(q(s), p)ν1( p|s)dp + (1 − β)
∫
S
U(q(s), p)ν2( p|s)dp
≤ β
∫
S
U(q(s), p)ν1( p|s)dp + (1 − β)
∫
S
U(q(s), p)ν2( p|s)dp
= βV (ν1( p|s)) + (1 − β)V (ν2( p|s)).
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The inequality holds because q1(s) and q2(s) maximize expected utility if the posterior
belief is given by ν1(·|s) and ν2(·|s), respectively. We have shown that the value function is
convex in the posterior belief. The claim in the proposition then follows from Lemma 1.
Proposition 3 captures the direct welfare effect resulting from market transparency:
since, by assumption, agricultural price risk cannot be hedged, the allocation of risk
remains unaffected when the agricultural and food market becomes more transparent.
All farmers benefit from higher market transparency because their exposure to price
risk is lower at the time when they make their production decisions. It can be shown
that transparency does increase ex ante expected output when the cost function is
convex.
However, things are different when price risk can be hedged. While the direct welfare
effect continues to be operative, an indirect welfare effect emerges: higher transparency
destroys some risk-sharing opportunities and thereby imposes welfare costs on risk-
averse farmers. If farmers are strongly risk-averse, the adverse indirect welfare effect
dominates the favorable direct welfare effect and overall welfare decreases with higher
market transparency. The normative implications of our economic issue for the agri-
cultural and food sector thus depend on the risk-sharing opportunities available in the
agri-food system.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the impact of changes in market transparency on agricul-
tural production levels. In particular, we have asked how the ex ante expected volume of
agricultural production responds to additional information when information also affects
the futures market for agricultural commodities. The analysis has produced two main
results. Firstly, higher market transparency increases farmers’ expected profits as long as
the cost function is convex. However, higher market transparency does not increase agri-
cultural production levels per se. If farmers’ marginal cost functions are concave (convex),
higher market transparency leads to higher (lower) ex ante expected levels of agricultural
production.
Secondly, economic interpretation reveals that the value of additional information
depends on two opposing effects. When farmer receive more reliable information they
are able to improve their decisions, thereby increasing ex ante expected utility. How-
ever, additional information may interfere with the operation of risk-sharing markets
thereby destroying some risk-sharing opportunities. Since farmers are risk-averse, ex ante
expected utility declines. Due to these opposing effects, the overall impact of higher
market transparency on farmers’ ex ante expected utility remains ambiguous. Accord-
ingly, when we vary the prevailing risk-sharing regime and assume that farmers have
no access to futures markets or other risk-sharing opportunities, higher market trans-
parency indeed does increase expected utility and leads to higher agricultural production
levels.
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